

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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1. The Communist Party of China is more independent in its decisions than are the European satellites of the USSR. The Chinese national character differs somewhat from the lackeyism of the eastern European satellites; the Chinese have a more nationalistic attitude, and their pride and strength surpass those of the other satellites.
2. It is a view of Soviet officialdom that there is too much speculation throughout the free world concerning the reputed contradictions between China and the USSR, and about the possibility of a Titoist schism occurring between these two nations. It is true, however, that the thousands of Soviet advisors to China are in effect poor ambassadors. The chief failing of these ambassadors is their attitude of superiority over the Chinese. Many of these Soviet advisors are actually imbued with the idea that they represent a super-race, and that their accomplishments are those of supermen. This crudeness on their part tends to harm, in no small degree, relations between the USSR and China.
3. Communist China has caused the USSR more trouble than any of the other satellites. Soviet-Chinese relations are admitted by the Soviets to be different from and more delicate than relations with the European satellites, and have caused the USSR to treat Chinese problems with caution and deference.

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25 YEAR RE-REVIEW

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5. There is no reason to believe that a Titoist type of defection on the part of China will take place; however, it remains a possibility. An example of the deferential treatment paid China by the USSR is Molotov's persistence in trying to have China admitted to important world conferences and the UN. It would be of useful importance to the USSR if she had another major ally sitting at the UN. The recent activities of the Soviets in pressing for China's admission to the circle of great powers is also predicated on the Soviet intention to prove to the leaders of Communist China that the USSR is aiding and supporting China, thereby enhancing the prestige of China in the eyes of the western world.
6. Tito's break with the USSR was a good object lesson for the Soviet leaders. That is why the present policies toward the satellites, especially that toward China, have become more flex

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